An Automatic Simulation Framework to Find Loopholes in Regimes
- Yun Wu and Yiqiao Li
Loopholes exist in nearly every regime, which leads to invalidity and instability in the running process of a regime. In this paper, we propose a new framework based on agent method and game theory to find loopholes in a regime, which contains two players with their clear payoffs. Following the principle of “winners stay, losers change”, agents make their own choices among strategies, and their choices can affect the payoffs of other players, resulting in a dynamic equilibrium that has obvious features in decision path, which can be easily found in the final figures after simulation. We further exploit typical cases, such as prisoner's dilemma, anti-coordination game, coordination game and harmony, of which the results have been mathematical proved, to illustrate the validity of our method. Finally, we make some regimes in this paper based on the classical case, “Boxed Pigs”, and find the loopholes in these regimes. By utilizing the framework proposed in this paper, managers are able to detect possible problems in advance at the time when they make regimes, which helps reduce the loss of costs caused by management and improve team relations.
Submitted on April 11, 2017; Revised on June 13, 2017; Accepted on August 21, 2017