Int J Performability Eng ›› 2018, Vol. 14 ›› Issue (2): 341-348.doi: 10.23940/ijpe.18.02.p15.341348

• Original articles • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Optimal Licensing in a Stackelberg Duopoly Market under Asymmetric Information of the Marginal Cost

Qingyou Yana, b, Le Yanga, Jieting Yina, and Youwei Wana   

  1. aSchool of Economic and Management, North China Electric Power University, Beijing, 102206, China
    bBeijing Energy Development Research Center, Beijing, 102206, China


In this paper, we investigate a Stackelberg leader’s licensing behavior and its welfare consequence when the rival holds private information about the marginal cost after licensing occurs. In order to examine the effect of the asymmetric information on the optimal licensing strategy, we consider three possible forms of a two-part tariff licensing contract (excluding excluding contract, separating contract, and pooling contract). The result shows that, the optimum is either an exclusive contract with pure royalty on the low type rival or a separating contract with different royalty rates on the different type rivals, which mainly depends on the possibility that the rival is a low type. Furthermore, there is a conflict between the innovator and social welfare when the possibility that the rival is a low type is very high.