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Optimal Licensing in a Stackelberg Duopoly Market under Asymmetric Information of the Marginal Cost

Volume 14, Number 2, February 2018, pp. 341-348
DOI: 10.23940/ijpe.18.02.p15.341348

Qingyou Yana,b, Le Yanga, Jieting Yina, Youwei Wana

aSchool of Economic and Management, North China Electric Power University, Beijing, 102206, China
bBeijing Energy Development Research Center, Beijing, 102206, China



Abstract:

In this paper, we investigate a Stackelberg leader’s licensing behavior and its welfare consequence when the rival holds private information about the marginal cost after licensing occurs. In order to examine the effect of the asymmetric information on the optimal licensing strategy, we consider three possible forms of a two-part tariff licensing contract (excluding excluding contract, separating contract, and pooling contract). The result shows that, the optimum is either an exclusive contract with pure royalty on the low type rival or a separating contract with different royalty rates on the different type rivals, which mainly depends on the possibility that the rival is a low type. Furthermore, there is a conflict between the innovator and social welfare when the possibility that the rival is a low type is very high.

 

References: 13

    1. A. Bagchi, and A. Mukherjee, “Technology licensing in a differentiated oligopoly,” International Review of Economics and Finance, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 455-465, 2014
    2. Y. W. Chen, L. F. S. Wang, S. J. Wu, and Y. P. Yang, “Technology licensing in mixed oligopoly,” International Review of Economics and Finance, vol. 31, no. 338, pp. 193-204, 2014
    3. N. T. Gallini, and B. D. Wright, “Technology transfer under asymmetric information,” RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 147-160, 1990
    4. J. S. Heywood, J. Li, and G. Ye, “Per unit vs. ad valorem royalties under asymmetric information,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 38-46, 2014
    5. Y. Li, and T. Yanagawa, “Patent licensing of Stackelberg manufacturer in a differentiated product market,” International Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 7-20, 2011.
    6. S. Kishimoto, and S. Muto, “Fee versus royalty policy in licensing through bargaining: An application of the Nash bargaining solution,” Bulletin of Economic Research, vol. 64, no.2, pp. 293-304, 2012
    7. S. Poddar, and U. B. Sinha, “The role of fixed fee and royalty in patent licensing,” Departmental Working Papers, vol. 121, no. 1, pp. 53-69, 2002
    8. P. W. Schmitz, “On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 106, no. 1, pp.177-189, 2002
    9. D. Sen, “On the coexistence of different licensing schemes,” International Review of Economics and Finance, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 393-413, 2005
    10. D. Sen, and Y. Tauman, “General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol.59, no. 1, pp. 163-186, 2007
    11. X. H. Wang, “Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model,” Economic Letter, vol. 60, no.1, pp. 55-62, 1998
    12. X. H. Wang, “Fee versus royalty licensing in a differentiated Cournot duopoly,” Journal of Economics and Business, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 253-266, 2002
    13. (online since July 20, 2017) (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2017.06.013)

       

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