International Journal of Performability Engineering, 2018, 14(12): 2915-2926 doi: 10.23940/ijpe.18.12.p2.29152926

A Dynamic Model for Winning Probability Estimation in a Long-Lasting Campaign

Kaiye Gao, Xiangbin Yan, Rui Peng,, Hui Qiu, and Langtao Wu

Donlinks School of Economics and Management, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing, 100083, China

*Corresponding Author(s): * E-mail address: gaokaiye1992@qq.com

First author contact:

Kaiye Gao is a Ph.D. student at the Donlinks School of Economics & Management, University of Science and Technology Beijing.
Xiangbin Yan is the dean of the Donlinks School of Economics & Management, University of Science and Technology Beijing.
Rui Peng is an associate professor at the Donlinks School of Economics & Management, University of Science and Technology Beijing. He is also an IEEE senior member and a member of the editorial board of Reliability Engineering & System Safety.
Hui Qiu is a Ph.D. student at the Donlinks School of Economics & Management, University of Science and Technology Beijing.
Langtao Wu is a Master's student at the Donlinks School of Economics & Management, University of Science and Technology Beijing.

Accepted:  Published:   

Abstract

Warfare is still unavoidable in the contemporary era, and it is essential for a country to estimate its winning probability when making decisions. While most previous studies are concerned with the result of a single battle, this paper focuses on a long-lasting campaign that may consist of many battles. First, this paper considers two parties and a single type of armed force. Moreover, a dynamic approach is proposed to describe the evolution of the campaign. In particular, each party has a certain number of armed forces in the beginning, and the campaign ends if all the armed forces for any party are extinguished. The probability for each party to win and the probability of a draw are analyzed. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the applications.

Keywords: warfare; winning probability; campaign; Markov process; armed force

PDF (612KB) Metadata Related articles Export EndNote| Ris| Bibtex

Cite this article

Kaiye Gao, Xiangbin Yan, Rui Peng, Hui Qiu, Langtao Wu. A Dynamic Model for Winning Probability Estimation in a Long-Lasting Campaign. International Journal of Performability Engineering, 2018, 14(12): 2915-2926 doi:10.23940/ijpe.18.12.p2.29152926

1. Introduction

War is a state of armed conflict between countries, societies, and informal groups, such as insurgents and militias. It is generally characterized by extreme aggression, destruction, and mortality, using regular or irregular military forces so that a lot of money and lives are spent in fighting the war. Warfare refers to the common activities and characteristics of types of war or of wars in general. It is still unavoidable in the contemporary era [1]. The defeated side usually suffers heavy losses, since war usually results in significant deterioration of infrastructure and the ecosystem, a decrease in social spending, famine, large-scale emigration from the war zone, and often the mistreatment of prisoners of war or civilians. Thus,it is essential for a country to estimate its winning probability based on the military power of itself and its opponent. A country can decide whether to join the war or can know how to prepare for the war and take action such as deploying the fighting forces during the war, based on the winning probability estimation.

There are many factors that can influence the final result of a campaign, such as strategy, weather, topography, information, war chest, and logistics supply [1-5]. With the advancement of technology, the amount of armed forces that a country owns plays an important role. Say, in the case of ocean war, owning some aircraft carriers would play a dominant role in winning against its opponent. First, this paper considers only single type of armed forces. In particular, two parties each with a certain number of armed forces are considered. Though it is normal that the party with a greater amount of armed forces wins, this is not always the case. It is not unusual in history that some stronger troops are defeated by weaker ones. Therefore, this paper assumes that the result of warfare is stochastic for each unit of time. A dynamic modeling process is used to model the evolution of a campaign, which ends if all the armed forces of any party is extinguished. The final result can be the winning of any parties or a draw, where both parties have their armed forces extinguished.

Quite a few previous studies discussed the winning probability in a war or a contest [6-10]. However, they are all about a single battle, not a long-lasting campaign, which is a dynamic process that includes many battles. In a long-lasting campaign, the side that faces the relatively superior situation at the beginning of the war may also have a chance to take a turn for the worse. Some previous models used for campaign analysis have noticed the long-lasting time [11-12]. However, they all emphasize the command and control aspects of the campaign, with representation of sensor and communication systems, information flows, command decision making, combat, and perception of the battlefield. Differently, this paper focuses on a quantitative evaluation of the winning probability for each party in a long-lasting campaign. In particular, the process of a campaign is modeled based on a Markov process [12-15], where the result of the campaign at a specific time point is stochastic and depends on the result of the campaign at the last time unit.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, the basic assumptions are introduced, and then we model the process of a long-lasting campaign and present the methods to calculate the probabilities of the final states. In Section 3, the proposed method is used for some special cases to show how our model works. Section 4 concludes this study and proposes some future possible researches.

   Nomenclature

AThe first party
BThe second party
AThe number of armed forces that party A owns
BThe number of armed forces that party B owns
MThe amount of armed forces for party A in the beginning
NThe amount of armed forces for party B in the beginning
TState transformation matrix in the case where the probabilities for events are cumulated
$\tilde{T}$State transformation matrix in the case where the probabilities for events are not cumulated
Q(0)Initial state distribution
Q(K)State probability at the Kth day after the campaign beginning
$\tilde{Q}\left( K \right)$State probability transiting from non-ending states on Kth day after the campaign beginning
PA(K)Probability of A winning that happens during the time from day 1 until day K
PB(K)Probability of B winning that happens during the time from day 1 until day K
PD(K)Probability of a draw that happens during the time from day 1 until day K
PU(K)Probability of an uncertainty that happens during the time from day 1 until day K
$\tilde{P}\tilde{A}\left( K \right)$Probability of A winning that happens just on day K
$\tilde{P}\tilde{B}\left( K \right)$Probability of B winning that happens just on day K
$\tilde{P}\tilde{D}\left( K \right)$Probability of a draw that happens just on day K
$\tilde{P}\tilde{U}\left( K \right)$Probability of an uncertainty that happens on day K
ETEnding time
$\Pr (ET=K)$Probability of ending at day K
EDExpected duration

New window| CSV


2. Model

2.1. Assumption

Here, we consider that there are two sides, A and B, in a campaign, as shown in Figure 1. For simplicity, we also use A and B to denote the numbers of armed forces that party A and party B own. The armed forces are assumed to be uniform, and both sides do not have any reserved forces or assists.

Figure 1

Figure 1.   Fighting process


It is assumed that the two parties fight every day, and during each day each party may lose some units of armed forces. For mathematical tractability, it is assumed that the number of armed forces annihilated each day is an integer. The campaign continues until the armed forces of at least one party have been extinguished.

2.2. Model Formulation

The numbers of armed forces owned by both parties in the beginningare denoted as M and N, respectively. Herein, we construct a Markov chain that hasthe following states:

$\left( A,B \right)\text{=}\left\{ \begin{align} & \left( M,N \right),\text{ }\left( M,N-1 \right),\text{ }\cdots ,\text{ }\left( M,0 \right),\text{ } \\ & \left( M-1,N \right),\text{ }\left( M-1,N-1 \right),\text{ }\cdots ,\text{ }\left( M-1,0 \right), \\ & \cdots ,\text{ } \\ & \left( 1,N \right),\text{ }\left( 1,N-1 \right),\text{ }\cdots ,\text{ }\left( 1,0 \right),\text{ } \\ & \left( 0,N \right),\text{ }\left( 0,N-1 \right),\text{ }\cdots ,\text{ }\left( 0,0 \right) \\ \end{align} \right.$

In these state, those with $A=0$ and $B\ne 0$ are the states that means “A wins”. Similarly, those with $A\ne 0$ and $B\text{=}0$ are the states that means “B wins”. On the other hand, (0, 0) indicates that the campaign ends with draw. Finally, the rest of the states indicatethat the ending is still uncertain and the campaign will continue. The transition relationships of the four kinds of states are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2

Figure 2.   State transition

* U indicates Uncertain, A indicates A winning, B indicates B winning, and D indicates draw


As shown in Figure 2, States A, B, and D are the ending states, which are the absorbing states. Once the campaign situation falls into these states, it will never have the chance to change.

Furthermore, the state probabilities can be summarized by a vector of $\left( M+1 \right)\times \left( N+1 \right)$ as

$Q=\left[ {{Q}_{1}},{{Q}_{2}},\cdots ,{{Q}_{L}} \right]=\left[ {{p}_{M,N}},{{p}_{M,N-1}},\cdots ,{{p}_{0,0}} \right]$

Where$L=\left( M+1 \right)\times \left( N+1 \right)$,${{Q}_{1}}={{p}_{M,N}}$,${{Q}_{2}}={{p}_{M,N-1}}$, , and ${{Q}_{l}}={{p}_{0,0}}.$

In addition, the state transition matrix is used to describe the state change that happens in each time unit as:

$\begin{matrix} & T=\left[ \begin{matrix} {{q}_{11}} & {{q}_{12}} & ... & {{q}_{1L}} \\ {{q}_{21}} & {{q}_{22}} & ... & {{q}_{2L}} \\ ... & ... & ... & ... \\ {{q}_{L1}} & {{q}_{L2}} & ... & {{q}_{LL}} \\ \end{matrix} \right] \\ & =\left[ \begin{matrix} {{p}_{\left( M,N \right),\left( M,N \right)}} & {{p}_{\left( M,N \right),\left( M,N-1 \right)}} & ... & {{p}_{\left( M,N \right),\left( M,0 \right)}} \\ {{p}_{\left( M-1,N \right),\left( M,N \right)}} & {{p}_{\left( M-1,N \right),\left( M-1,N-1 \right)}} & ... & {{p}_{\left( M-1,N \right),\left( M-1,0 \right)}} \\ ... & ... & ... & ... \\ {{p}_{\left( 0,N \right),\left( 0,N \right)}} & {{p}_{\left( 0,N \right),\left( 0,N-1 \right)}} & ... & {{p}_{\left( 0,N \right),\left( 0,0 \right)}} \\ \end{matrix} \right]\ \ \\ \end{matrix}$

Where each ${{p}_{\left( i,j \right),\left( ii,jj \right)}},$$0\le ii\le i\le M,\text{ }0\le jj\le j\le M$ is the probability that (A,B) equals (ii,jj) given that it equals (i,j) at the last time unit. Inthe transition probability matrix, the sum of every row is equal to 1 by definition.

In this matrix, the absorbing probabilities are set for those states that any side has no residual armed forces. The mathematical expression for this case is shown in Equation (4).

$\left\{ \begin{matrix} {{p}_{\left( \text{0,}Y \right),\left( 0,Y \right)}}=1,\quad \ \ \,Y=0,\cdots ,N \\ {{p}_{\left( X,0 \right),\left( X,0 \right)}}=1,\ \quad X=0,\cdots ,M \\ \end{matrix} \right.$

This indicates that the state willbe maintained once the armed forces of any side are extinguished, that is, the state shown in (4). It is noted that ${{p}_{\left( \text{0},0 \right),\left( \text{0},0 \right)}}=1$ holds from (4), which corresponds to a draw ending.

Then, we can have the state probability at the Kth day after the campaign begins, $Q\left( K \right)$, as shown below:

$Q\left( K \right)=Q\left( 0 \right)\cdot {{T}^{K}},\quad K=1,2,\cdots ,\infty $

Where $Q\left( 0 \right)$ indicates the initial state.

As discussed above, the ending condition is that the fighting resources of any side are totally eliminated. Otherwise, the campaign continues until the ending condition is obtained.

From (5), we can obtain the probability of A winning in K days, which is the sum of all the probabilities of the states that A wins during the first K days, as shown below:

$PA\left( K \right)=\sum\limits_{i=0}^{M}{\sum\limits_{j=0}^{N}{P{{\left( K \right)}_{i,j}}\cdot 1(i>0,j=0)}}$

Where 1(TRUE)=1 and 1(FALSE)=0.

Similarly, we can have the probability of B winning in K days, and it can the mathematically expressed by

$PB\left( K \right)=\sum\limits_{i=0}^{M}{\sum\limits_{j=0}^{N}{P{{\left( K \right)}_{i,j}}\cdot 1(i=0,j>0)}}$

The probability of a draw is the sum of all the states that the fighting resources of both sides are total eliminated. The probability of this case can be expressed by

$PD\left( K \right)=\sum\limits_{i=0}^{M}{\sum\limits_{j=0}^{N}{P{{\left( K \right)}_{i,j}}\cdot 1(i\text{=}0,j=0)}}$

The last situation is the state corresponding to an uncertain outcome, where both sides still have some armed forces left. The probability of this situation can be expressed by

$PU\left( K \right)=\sum\limits_{i=0}^{M}{\sum\limits_{j=0}^{N}{P{{\left( K \right)}_{i,j}}\cdot 1(i>0,j>0)}}$

The sum of the four probabilities for any K should be 1, that is

$PA\left( K \right)\text{+}PB\left( K \right)+PD\left( K \right)+PU\left( K \right)=1$

Note that PA(K), PB(K), PD(K), and PU(K) represent the probability of A winning, B winning, a draw, and an uncertainty that happens during the time from day 1 until day K. If one only wants to calculate the probability of these events that happen on a particular day K, then the transition matrix needs to be changed as below:

$\begin{matrix} & \tilde{T}=\left[ \begin{matrix} {{{\tilde{p}}}_{\left( M,N \right),\left( M,N \right)}} & {{{\tilde{p}}}_{\left( M,N \right),\left( M,N-1 \right)}} & ... & {{{\tilde{p}}}_{\left( M,N \right),\left( M,0 \right)}} \\ {{{\tilde{p}}}_{\left( M-1,N \right),\left( M,N \right)}} & {{{\tilde{p}}}_{\left( M-1,N \right),\left( M-1,N-1 \right)}} & ... & {{{\tilde{p}}}_{\left( M-1,N \right),\left( M-1,0 \right)}} \\ ... & ... & ... & ... \\ {{{\tilde{p}}}_{\left( 0,N \right),\left( 0,N \right)}} & {{{\tilde{p}}}_{\left( 0,N \right),\left( 0,N-1 \right)}} & ... & {{{\tilde{p}}}_{\left( 0,N \right),\left( 0,0 \right)}} \\ \end{matrix} \right] \\ & \ \ \ =\left[ \begin{matrix} {{{\tilde{q}}}_{11}} & {{{\tilde{q}}}_{12}} & ... & {{{\tilde{q}}}_{1L}} \\ {{{\tilde{q}}}_{21}} & {{{\tilde{q}}}_{22}} & ... & {{{\tilde{q}}}_{2L}} \\ ... & ... & ... & ... \\ {{{\tilde{q}}}_{L1}} & {{{\tilde{q}}}_{L2}} & ... & {{{\tilde{q}}}_{LL}} \\ \end{matrix} \right] \\ \end{matrix}$

Where

$\left\{ \begin{matrix} & {{{\tilde{p}}}_{\left( \text{0,}Y \right),\bullet }}=\text{0}\ ,\quad \quad \quad \quad \text{ }Y=0,\cdots ,N \\ & {{{\tilde{p}}}_{\left( X,0 \right),\bullet }}=\text{0}\ ,\ \quad \quad \quad \ \ \ X=0,\cdots ,M \\ & {{{\tilde{p}}}_{\left( X,Y \right),\bullet }}={{p}_{\left( X,Y \right),\bullet }}\ ,\quad \ \ \ X=1,\cdots ,M,\text{ }Y=1,\cdots ,N \\ \end{matrix} \right.$

It can be seen that the “1” in ${{p}_{\left( \text{0,}X \right),\left( 0,X \right)}}$, $X=0,\cdots ,N$, and ${{p}_{\left( Y\text{,0} \right),\left( Y,0 \right)}}$, $Y=0,\cdots,M$ of the original matrix has been changed to “0” in order not to take into account these ending events that happen before day K. The rest of the values are the same as in the T.

Then, we can have the state probability transiting from non-ending states on theKth day after the campaign begins, $\tilde{Q}\left( K \right)$, as shown below:

$\tilde{Q}\left( K \right)=\tilde{Q}\left( 0 \right)\cdot {{\tilde{T}}^{K}},\quad K=1,2,\cdots ,\infty $

Where $\tilde{Q}\left( 0 \right)\text{=}Q\left( 0 \right)$ is the initial state distribution.

Then, the probability of A winning and B winning just on theKth day after the campaign begins can be calculated by

$\tilde{P}\tilde{A}\left( K \right)=\sum\limits_{i=0}^{M}{\sum\limits_{j=0}^{N}{\tilde{P}{{\left( K \right)}_{i,j}}\cdot |\left( i>0,j=0 \right)}}$

and

$\tilde{P}\tilde{B}\left( K \right)=\sum\limits_{i=0}^{M}{\sum\limits_{j=0}^{N}{\tilde{P}{{\left( K \right)}_{i,j}}\cdot |\left( i=0,j>0 \right)}}$

Similarly, the probability of a draw andan uncertainty can be calculated by

$\tilde{P}\tilde{D}\left( K \right)=\sum\limits_{i=0}^{M}{\sum\limits_{j=0}^{N}{\tilde{P}{{\left( K \right)}_{i,j}}\cdot |\left( i\text{=}0,j=0 \right)}}$

and

$\tilde{P}\tilde{U}\left( K \right)=\sum\limits_{i=0}^{M}{\sum\limits_{j=0}^{N}{\tilde{P}{{\left( K \right)}_{i,j}}\cdot |\left( i>0,j>0 \right)}}$

Similarly, the sum of the four probabilities also should be 1:

$\sum\limits_{K=1}^{\infty }{PA\left( K \right)\text{+}PB\left( K \right)+PD\left( K \right)+PU\left( K \right)}=1$

Then, we can obtainthe probability distribution of the ending time, ET, as shown below:

$\Pr (ET=K)=\sum\limits_{K=1}^{\infty }{PA\left( K \right)\text{+}PB\left( K \right)+PD\left( K \right)}$

Accordingly, we can calculate the expected duration of this campaign, ED, as shown below:

$ED=\sum\limits_{K=1}^{\infty }{K\cdot \left( PA\left( K \right)\text{+}PB\left( K \right)+PD\left( K \right) \right)}$

As a summary, we use a flowchart to show the process of how our model works, as shown in Figure 3. Here, the ending of the campaign is set as the probability of an uncertainty being less than 0.0001.

Figure 3

Figure 3.   Flowchart of the proposed model


3. Illustrative Examples

In this section, we set two special cases as examples to show the working process of the proposed model. The basic background is that there are two sides in a long-lasting ground campaign, A and B. In the beginning, each side has several armed forces.

3.1. Case 1

We first consider a fair start, whereboth sides are assumed to have two armed forces. Then, we can have the state space of this case, as shown below:

$\left( A,B \right)=\left\{ \begin{align} & \left( 2,2 \right),\text{ }\left( 2,1 \right),\text{ }\left( 2,0 \right),\text{ } \\ & \left( 1,2 \right),\text{ }\ \,\left( 1,1 \right),\text{ }\ \left( 1,0 \right),\text{ } \\ & \left( 0,2 \right),\text{ }\left( 0,1 \right),\text{ }\left( 0,0 \right) \\ \end{align} \right.$

In these states, (2, 0) and (1, 0) are the states that A wins. Similarly, (0, 2) and (0, 1) are the states that B wins. On the other hand, (0, 0) indicates that the campaign is tied and the rest of the states indicatethat the campaign will continue.

Then, the state probability can be expressed by a vector of nine elements as

$Q=\left[ {{Q}_{1}},{{Q}_{2}},\cdots ,{{Q}_{9}} \right]=\left[ {{P}_{2,2}},{{P}_{2,1}},\cdots ,{{P}_{0,0}} \right]$

Where ${{Q}_{1}}={{P}_{2,2}}$, ${{Q}_{2}}={{P}_{2,1}}$, , and ${{Q}_{9}}={{P}_{0,0}}.$

Next, according to Equation (21), the initial state vector is $Q\left( 0 \right)=\text{ }\left[ 1,0,\cdots ,0 \right]$, which indicates that the number of armed forces of the two sides are (2,2).

For convenience, we set a probability matrix for this special case. Note that the probability of annihilating armed forces is set to be higher for the side with more armed forces. This is consistent with intuition. The probability matrix we used here is shown as following. Last but not least, the probabilities of transition to other states from ending states including A wins, B wins, and a draware set to zero.

$\begin{matrix} & T=\left[ \begin{matrix} {{q}_{11}} & {{q}_{12}} & ... & {{q}_{19}} \\ {{q}_{21}} & {{q}_{22}} & ... & {{q}_{29}} \\ ... & ... & ... & ... \\ {{q}_{91}} & {{q}_{92}} & ... & {{q}_{99}} \\ \end{matrix} \right] \\ & =\left[ \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.5 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.1 \\ 0.5 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.05 \\ 0.15 \\ 1 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0.5 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.1 \\ 0.15 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0.15 \\ 0.5 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.04 \\ 0.15 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0.02 \\ 0.2 \\ 1 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.05 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0.15 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.04 \\ 0.02 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0.15 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0.2 \\ \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.02 \\ 0.03 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0.03 \\ 0.1 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ \end{matrix} \\ \end{matrix} \right] \end{matrix}$

Then, according to (11), we can also determine the transition probability matrix for one day, $widetilde{T}$, which does not accumulate the probability of events that happened before the day of concern as:

$\begin{matrix} & \tilde{T}=\left[ \begin{matrix} {{{\tilde{q}}}_{11}} & {{{\tilde{q}}}_{12}} & ... & {{{\tilde{q}}}_{19}} \\ {{{\tilde{q}}}_{21}} & {{{\tilde{q}}}_{22}} & ... & {{{\tilde{q}}}_{29}} \\ ... & ... & ... & ... \\ {{{\tilde{q}}}_{91}} & {{{\tilde{q}}}_{92}} & ... & {{{\tilde{q}}}_{99}} \\ \end{matrix} \right] \\ & =\left[ \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.5 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.1 \\ 0.5 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.05 \\ 0.15 \\ \text{0} \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0.5 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.1 \\ 0.15 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0.15 \\ 0.5 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.04 \\ 0.15 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0.02 \\ 0.2 \\ \text{0} \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.05 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0.15 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ \text{0} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.04 \\ 0.02 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0.15 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0.2 \\ \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ \text{0} \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.02 \\ 0.03 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0.03 \\ 0.1 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \text{0} \\ \end{matrix} \\ \end{matrix} \right] \end{matrix}$

Finally, using the model proposed in Section 2, we can obtain various results for Case 1, as shown in Section 4.

3.2. Case 2

Second, we consider an unfair start. In this case, one side has two armed forces while the other one only has one armed force. Then, we can obtain the state space of this case, as shown below.

$\left( A,B \right)=\left\{ \begin{matrix} & \left( 2,1 \right),\text{ }\left( 2,0 \right),\text{ } \\ & \left( 1,1 \right),\text{ }\ \left( 1,0 \right),\text{ } \\ & \left( 0,1 \right),\text{ }\left( 0,0 \right) \\ \end{matrix} \right.$

In these states, (2,0) and (1,0) are the states that A wins. However, the situation is critical for B, where only (0,1) is the state that B wins. Others are similar to Case 1: (0,0) indicates that the campaign is tied; the rest of states indicatethat the campaign will continue.

Then, the state probability can be expressed by a vector of six elements as

$Q=\left[ {{Q}_{1}},{{Q}_{2}},{{Q}_{3}},{{Q}_{4}},{{Q}_{5}},{{Q}_{6}} \right]=\text{ }\left[ {{P}_{2,1}},{{P}_{2,0}},{{P}_{1,1}},{{P}_{1,0}},{{P}_{0,1}},{{P}_{0,0}} \right]$

Where ${{Q}_{1}}=\text{ }{{P}_{2,1}}$, ${{Q}_{2}}=\text{ }{{P}_{1,1}}$, , and ${{Q}_{6}}=\text{ }{{P}_{0,0}}$.

Next, according to Equation (25), the initial state vector is $Q\left( 0 \right)=\left[ 1,0,\cdots ,0 \right]$, which indicates that the armed forces of two sides are (2,1).

For comparison, we build the transition probability matrix for Case 2 using some information from the transition probability matrix of Case 1. In particular, when the transition process is the same as Case 1, the probability in the matrix also uses the same value as Case 1. The transition probability matrix for Case 2 is shown below:

$\begin{matrix} & T=\left[ \begin{matrix} {{q}_{11}} & {{q}_{12}} & ... & {{q}_{16}} \\ {{q}_{21}} & {{q}_{22}} & ... & {{q}_{26}} \\ ... & ... & ... & ... \\ {{q}_{61}} & {{q}_{62}} & ... & {{q}_{66}} \\ \end{matrix} \right] \\ & \text{=}\left[ \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.5 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.15 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.15 \\ 0 \\ 0.5 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} 0.15 \\ \begin{matrix} 0 \\ \begin{matrix} 0.2 \\ 1 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.02 \\ 0 \\ 0.2 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.03 \\ 0 \\ 0.1 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ \end{matrix} \\ \end{matrix} \right] \end{matrix}$

Similarly with Case 1, according to Equation 11, we can also determine the transition probability matrix for one day, $\tilde{T}$, as shown below.

$\begin{matrix} & \tilde{T}=\left[ \begin{matrix} {{{\tilde{q}}}_{11}} & {{{\tilde{q}}}_{12}} & ... & {{{\tilde{q}}}_{16}} \\ {{{\tilde{q}}}_{21}} & {{{\tilde{q}}}_{22}} & ... & {{{\tilde{q}}}_{26}} \\ ... & ... & ... & ... \\ {{{\tilde{q}}}_{61}} & {{{\tilde{q}}}_{62}} & ... & {{{\tilde{q}}}_{66}} \\ \end{matrix} \right] \\ & \text{=}\left[ \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.5 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.15 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.15 \\ 0 \\ 0.5 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} 0.15 \\ \begin{matrix} 0 \\ \begin{matrix} 0.2 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.02 \\ 0 \\ 0.2 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \begin{matrix} 0.03 \\ 0 \\ 0.1 \\ \end{matrix} \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{matrix} \\ \end{matrix} \right] \end{matrix}$

Finally, using the model proposed in Section 2, we can obtain various results for Case 2, as shown in Section 4.

4. Results

In this section, we first display the results we calculated using the transition matrix, $T.$ Tables 1 and 2 show the probabilities of different states during the first K days for Case 1 and Case 2 respectively.

Table 1.   Winning probabilities for Case 1 in K days

DayA winsB winsDrawUncertain
10.090.090.020.8
20.1870.1870.0460.58
30.26750.26750.070.395
40.32670.32670.0890.2575
50.36740.36740.10270.1625
60.39390.39390.11210.1
70.41070.41070.11820.0603
80.4210.4210.12210.0358
90.42730.42730.12450.0209
100.4310.4310.1260.0121
110.43310.43310.12680.0069
120.43440.43440.12730.0039
130.43510.43510.12760.0022
140.43550.43550.12780.0012
150.43570.43570.12790.0007
160.43580.43580.12790.0004
170.43590.43590.1280.0002
180.4360.4360.1280.0001
190.4360.4360.1280.00006

New window| CSV


Table 2.   Winning probabilities for Case 2 in K days

DayA winsB winsDrawUncertain
10.30.020.030.65
20.480.060.060.4
30.5850.0950.08250.2375
40.6450.120.09750.1375
50.67870.13620.10690.0781
60.69750.14620.11250.0437
70.70780.15220.11580.0242
80.71340.15560.11770.0133
90.71650.15760.11870.0072
100.71810.15870.11930.0039
110.71900.15930.11960.0021
120.71950.15960.11980.0011
130.71910.15980.11990.0006
140.71990.15990.11990.0003
150.71990.15990.12000.0002
160.72000.16000.12000.0001
170.72000.16000.12000.000005

New window| CSV


From Tables 1 and 2, we can see that the winning probabilities of A and B as well as the probability of a draw are increasing with time, while the probability ofan uncertainty is decreasing with time.

The ending states will converge to a constant after a period. The case of (2,2) converges to (0.436,0.436,0.128) after about 20 days, while the case of (2,1) converges to (0.72,0.16,0.12) after about 17 days. It is noted that the campaign of (2,1) ends faster than that of (2,2). In fact, there is a large chance that the (2,2) may need a few days to transit into (2,1) or (1,2) first before it can finally transit to (2,0), (0,2), (1,0), (0,1), or (0,0). Actually,astime elapses, the campaign has an increasingly higher probability to have already ended before the day of concern.

Next, we display the results we calculated using transition matrix $\tilde{T}.$ Tables 3 and 4 show the probability of different results that happen on the Kth day after the campaign begins and the probability of an uncertaintyuntil day K, for Case 1 and 2 respectively.

Table 3.   Winning probabilities for Case 1 on Kth day

DayA winsB winsDrawUncertain
10.090.090.020.8
20.0970.0970.0260.58
30.08050.08050.0240.395
40.05930.05930.0190.2575
50.04060.04060.01380.1625
60.02660.02660.00940.1
70.01680.01680.00610.0603
80.01030.01030.00390.0358
90.00620.00620.00240.0209
100.00370.00370.00140.0121
110.00220.00220.00090.0069
120.00120.00120.00050.0039
130.00070.00070.00030.0022
140.00040.00040.00020.0012
150.00020.00020.09520.0007
160.000010.000010.0000050.0004
170.0000070.0000070.0000030.0002
180.0000040.0000040.0000020.0001
190.0000020.0000020.0000010.00006

New window| CSV


Table 4.   Winning probabilities for Case 2 on Kth day

DayA winB winDrawUncertain
10.30.020.030.65
20.180.040.030.4
30.1050.0350.02250.2375
40.060.0250.0150.1375
50.03380.01630.00940.0781
60.01870.010.00560.0437
70.01030.00590.00330.0242
80.00560.00340.00190.0133
90.0030.0020.00110.0072
100.00160.00110.00060.0039
110.00090.00060.00030.0021
120.00050.00030.00020.0011
130.0000250.0000180.0000010.0006
140.000010.0000090.0000050.0003
150.0000070.0000050.0000030.0002
160.0000040.0000030.0000020.0001
170.0000020.0000010.00000080.000005

New window| CSV


From Tables 3 and 4, we can see that the winning probabilities of A and B as well as the probability of a draw first increase to peak value on day 2 and then decrease with time, while the probability of an uncertainty only decreases with time from the beginning.

Unlike Tables 1 and 2, all the four probabilities infinitely tend to 0. In other words, the probabilities will converge to (0, 0, 0, 0) after a period. The case for (2, 2) converges to (0, 0, 0, 0) after about 20 days, while (2, 1) uses about 17 days.

Finally, according to Equation 19 and the results from Tables 3 and 4, we also calculate the ending probability of each day, as shown in Figure 4. Then, the expected duration of the two cases can also be obtained, which are 3.4 days for Case 1 and 2.6 days for Case 2.

Figure 4

Figure 4.   Probability distributions of ending time andduration for Case 1 and Case 2


5. Conclusions

This paper proposes a dynamic model to estimate the winning probability for a long-lasting campaign. In particular, two parties each with a number of armed forces in the beginning are considered. The Markov process is used to describe the changing of their armed forces with time. The probability for each party to win and the probability of a draw ending are analysed. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the applications. The results show that the winning chance for each side will finally converge to a constant value.

This work can be extended in multiple ways in the future. First, this paper considers single type of armed forces, which can be extended to combine different types of armed forces. Second, the logistic consumption of the armed forces can be incorporated. Third, the optimal allocation of resources into building different types of armed forces and providing logistic services can be investigated.

Reference

J. M .

Box-Steffensmeier,“A Dynamic Analysis of the Role of War Chests in Campaign Strategy

,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 352-371, 1996

[Cited within: 2]

G. Hughes , “

Militias in Internal Warfare: From the Colonial Era to the Contemporary Middle East

,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 196-225, 2004

DOI:10.1080/09592318.2015.1129171      URL    

Although it is a tenet of political science that the modern state possesses a ‘monopoly of violence’, governments have repeatedly used militias outside the formal chain of command of their armed forces when waging counterinsurgency (COIN), and in recent conflicts the USA, UK, and other Western powers have used irregular forces when fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. War-weariness and financial austerity is likely to encourage American and allied policymakers to rely on auxiliaries as proxies, despite the fact that historical experience demonstrates that the use of militias in COIN can have counter productive consequences, not least for state stability. This article also concludes that the tendency of some Middle Eastern states (notably Iraq and Syria) to ‘coup-proof’ their militaries renders them even more dependent on militias in the face of a sustained internal revolt, as their regular armed forces collapse under the stress of combat. In this respect, there is a direct link between ‘coup-proofing’, dependence on irregular auxiliaries in civil war, and the erosion of the state’s integrity.

B. Kousalya and T. Vasanthi ,“

Protection of k-out-of-n Systems Under Intentional Attacks Using Imperfect False Elements

,” International Journal of Performability Engineering,Vol. 9, No. 5, pp. 529-537, 2013

J. Zhang , “

Research on the Financial Resources Mobilization of the Modern War

,” Journal of Academy of Equipment, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 30-34, 2013

URL    

As the cost of the war is being upward,the method for the war becoming multivariant,the economic damage of the war becoming more and more serious,the financial resources mobilization becomes more and more important. The financial resources mobilization of modern war includes two aspects of the finance and the banking. The quantity of the financial resources mobilization is determined by the war's demand,the sustain of the routine military training in peacetime and the potential capacity. The modern war has presented much more new requirements,so the correlative system and mechanism,the mobilization platform and passageway,etc,must be set up and perfected.

S. Wang, B. Ye, Y. Tan , “

Research of National-Defense Mobilization Resources Management Information System

,” Computer Knowledge & Technology, Vol. 8, No. 18, pp. 4314-4316, 2012

URL     [Cited within: 1]

Information and information technology in modern war plays a pivotal role in the control of information,right to decide battle field initiative,even is the victory of the war. The national defense mobilization resources management is the key foundation of the national defense mobilization.This article focuses on the national defense mobilization of resource management,analysis of national defense mobili zation of resources information system of goals,on the composition of the system function and related key technical problems.

S. Iver and T. Killingback , “

Evolutionary Dynamics of a Smoothed War of Attrition Game

,” Journal of Theoretical Biology,Vol. 396, pp. 25-41, 2016

DOI:10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.02.014      URL     PMID:26903203      [Cited within: 1]

61Formulation of a new game theory model to describe the War of Attrition when there are errors in the implementation of an individuals strategy and possibly non-linear costs.61Detailed study of the evolutionary dynamics of the model, both analytically using adaptive dynamics and through individual-based simulations.61Complex and subtle evolutionary outcomes can readily arise in this model which are quite different from those that occur in the classical War of Attrition model.

G. Levitin and K. Hausken , “

Preventive Strike vs. False Targets and Protection inDefenseStrategy

,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety, Vol. 96, No. 8, pp. 912-924, 2011

DOI:10.1016/j.ress.2011.03.008      URL    

A defender allocates its resource between defending an object passively and striking preventively against an attacker seeking to destroy the object. With no preventive strike the defender distributes its entire resource between deploying false targets, which the attacker cannot distinguish from the genuine object, and protecting the object. If the defender strikes preventively, the attacker's vulnerability depends on its protection and on the defender's resource allocated to the strike. If the attacker survives, the object's vulnerability depends on the attacker's revenge attack resource allocated to the attacked object. The optimal defense resource distribution between striking preventively, deploying the false targets and protecting the object is analyzed. Two cases of the attacker strategy are considered: when the attacker attacks all of the targets and when it chooses a number of targets to attack. An optimization model is presented for making a decision about the efficiency of the preventive strike based on the estimated attack probability, dependent on a variety of model parameters.

L. Liua, J. Yua, G. Zhi , “

A Kind of Stochastic Duel Model for Guerrilla War ☆

,” European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 171, No. 2, pp. 430-438, 2006

DOI:10.1016/j.ejor.2004.09.032      URL    

This paper discusses a stochastic duel model between two forces. On one side are the guerrilla (or terrorists), and on the other an organized force of some sort. The model is called guerrilla war. The guerrilla side has a number of advantages such as choice of location and time of engagement, concealment by topography, observation of the intended target, and line of fire. We represent these advantages in what we believe is a realistic scenario of a duel between the guerrilla force and the organized force. By the four suppositions coinciding with the practical duel background, the paper deduces the formulas for calculating the winning probabilities for the both sides.

R. Peng, Q. Zhai, G. Levitin , “

Defending a Single Object Against an Attacker Trying to Detect a Subset of False Targets

,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety, Vol. 149, pp. 137-147, 2016

DOI:10.1016/j.ress.2016.01.002      URL    

61A defense-attack problem is studied as a two-period min–max game.61Both intelligence contest over false targets and impact contest are considered.61Optimal defense and attack strategies are investigated with different parameters.

D. Wu, H. Xiao, R. Peng , “

Object Defense with Preventive Strike and False Targets

,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety, Vol. 169,pp. 76-80, 2018

[Cited within: 1]

J. Herington, A. Lane, N. Corrigan, J. A. Golightly , “

Campaign Analysis: Representation of Historical Events In a Military Campaign Simulation Model

,” in Proceedings of the Winter Simulation Conference,San Diego, CA, USA, 2002

DOI:10.1109/WSC.2002.1172971      URL     [Cited within: 1]

Dstl has sponsored the development and use of several campaign level models of military operations. The models are required to provide insight into force assessment, procurement decisions of future concepts and for investigations into potential doctrinal developments. COMAND is a theatre level representation of the naval-air (maritime) campaign. COMAND also contains a simple representation of the joint force influence on the land campaign. COMAND is a stochastic model, and runs on a desktop PC under Windows NT. The key to COMAND is the representation of command and control aspects of the campaign, with representation of sensor and communication systems, information flows, command decision making, combat and perception of the battlefield. As part of the process to establish the validation status of COMAND, an attempt was made to replicate the 1982 Falkland Islands Campaign. This attempt was largely successful, and provided much information on the strengths and weaknesses of the model.

B. Taylor and A. Lane ,“

Development of a Novel Family of Military Campaign Simulation Models

,” Journal of the Operational Research Society,Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 333-339, 2004

DOI:10.1057/palgrave.jors.2601714      URL     [Cited within: 2]

Dstl has sponsored the development and use of a family of campaign level models of military operations. The models are required to provide an insight into force structure assessment, procurement decisions and doctrinal developments. The family comprises CLARION (land/air war-fighting), COMAND (maritime/air war-fighting) and DIAMOND (non-war-fighting). The two key features of the family are the core role played by the representation of C3I (command, control, communications and information) and the classification of combat units by their interactions with one another at an aggregated level rather than by treating them as a collection of specific combat platforms.

H. Jiang , “

Exploring the Effects of Group Interaction in Large Display Systems

,” International Journal of Performability Engineering, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 159-167, 2018

C. Wang, L. Xing, R. Peng, Z. Pan , “

Competing Failure Analysis in Phased-Mission Systems with Multiple Functional Dependence Groups

,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety,Vol. 164, pp. 24-33, 2017

DOI:10.1016/j.ress.2017.02.006      URL    

A phased-mission system (PMS) involves multiple, consecutive, non-overlapping phases of operation. The system structure function and component failure behavior in a PMS can change from phase to phase, posing big challenges to the system reliability analysis. Further complicating the problem is the functional dependence (FDEP) behavior where the failure of certain component(s) causes other component(s) to become unusable or inaccessible or isolated. Previous studies have shown that FDEP can cause competitions between failure propagation and failure isolation in the time domain. While such competing failure effects have been well addressed in single-phase systems, only little work has focused on PMSs with a restrictive assumption that a single FDEP group exists in one phase of the mission. Many practical systems (e.g., computer systems and networks), however may involve multiple FDEP groups during the mission. Moreover, different FDEP groups can be dependent due to sharing some common components; they may appear in a single phase or multiple phases. This paper makes new contributions by modeling and analyzing reliability of PMSs subject to multiple FDEP groups through a Markov chain-based methodology. Propagated failures with both global and selective effects are considered. Four case studies are presented to demonstrate application of the proposed method.

W. Yan and L. Li ,“

An Analytical Method for Dynamic Evolution of Attack Process based on Markov Game

,” International Journal of Performability Engineering,Vol. 13, No. 5, pp. 763-774, 2017

[Cited within: 1]

/